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The Transformation of the Juvenile Court
Barry C. Feld*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ideological changes in the cultural conception of children
and in strategies of social control during the nineteenth century
led to the creation of the juvenile court. At the dawn of the
twentieth century, Progressive reformers applied the new theories of social control to the new ideas about childhood and created a social welfare alternative to criminal courts to treat
criminal and noncriminal misconduct by youth.
The Supreme Court's decision In re Gault1 in 1967,
however, began transforming the juvenile court into a very
2
different institution than the Progressives contemplated.
Progressives envisioned an informal court whose dispositions
reflected the "best interests" of the child. In Gault, the
Supreme Court engrafted formal trial procedures onto the juvenile court's individualized treatment sentencing scheme.
Although the Court did not intend to alter the juvenile court's
therapeutic mission, in the past two decades, legislative, judicial, and administrative responses to Gault have modified the
court's jurisdiction, purpose, and procedures. As a result, juve* Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This Essay
was originally presented as the inaugural lecture for Centennial Professor of
Law on September 24, 1990. I am very grateful to Dean Robert Stein and the
many generous alumni and donors for the privilege and honor of being named
the first Centennial Professor of Law.
I have received a great deal of professional and personal assistance
throughout my career. For the past decade, Bob Stein has been unstinting in
his support and encouragement. Many colleagues have generously given their
time, energy, and insights to improve my work. Finally, words cannot express
my gratitude to my wife, Patricia, for her unconditional love, which provides a
source of strength and security. I dedicate this Essay to my children, Ari and
Julia, with hope for the future of all young people.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. See Feld, CriminalizingJuvenile Justice: Rules of Procedurefor Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 141-64 (1984); see also D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN
PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 205 (1980); E. RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS:
AMERICA'S JuVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 148-62 (1978).
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nile courts now converge procedurally and substantively with
3
adult criminal courts.
Three types of reforms - jurisdictional, jurisprudential,
and procedural - provide a vehicle for examining the contemporary juvenile court. The Supreme Court's recognition that
juvenile courts often failed to realize their benevolent purposes
has led to two jurisdictional changes. Status offenses are juvenile misconduct, such as truancy or incorrigibility, which would
not be crimes if committed by adults. Recent reforms limit the
dispositions that noncriminal offenders may receive or even remove status offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. A second
jurisdictional change is the criminalizing of serious juvenile offenders. Increasingly, courts and legislatures transfer some
youths from juvenile courts to criminal courts for prosecution
as adults. 4 As jurisdiction contracts with the removal of serious
offenders and noncriminal status offenders, the sentences that
delinquents charged with crimes receive are now based on the
idea of just deserts rather than the child's "real needs." Proportional and determinate sentences based on the present offense and prior record, rather than the "best interests" of the
child, dictate the length, location, and intensity of intervention.5 As punishment assumes a greater role in sentencing
juveniles, issues of procedural justice emerge. Although theoretically, juvenile courts' procedural safeguards closely resemble those of criminal courts, in reality, the justice routinely
afforded juveniles is lower than the minimum insisted upon for
adults.
The substantive and procedural convergence between juvenile and criminal courts eliminates virtually all of the differ3.

See generally Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principleof Offense:

Punishmen Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. 821
(1988) [hereinafter Feld, Punishment Treatment]; Feld, supra note 2, at 169276. For information on the convergence of juvenile and criminal courts in
Minnesota, see Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious
Young Offender: Dismantling the RehabilitativeIdeal, 65 MiNN. L. REv. 167,
241-42 (1981) [hereinafter Feld, Dismantling the RehabilitativeIdeal].
4. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers, JudicialActivism, and Legislative Default, 8 LAW & INEQUALITY 1, 11
(1990) [hereinafter Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases]; Feld, Dismantling the
Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 3, at 241-42; Feld, Juvenile Court Meets the
Principleof Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 503-19 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative
Changes]; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution" The
Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV.
515 (1978).

5.

Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 3, at 832-38.
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ences in strategies of social control between youths and adults.
As a result, no reason remains to maintain a separate juvenile
court whose only distinction is its persisting procedural deficiencies. Yet, even with the juvenile court's transformation
from an informal, rehabilitative agency into a scaled-down
criminal court, it continues to operate virtually unreformed.
The juvenile court's continued existence despite these changes
reflects an ambivalence about children and their control, and
provides an opportunity to re-examine basic assumptions about
the nature and competence of young people.

A. THE PROGRESSIVE JUVENmLE
PROCEDURAL INFORmALITY AND
COURT INDIVIDUALIZED, OFFENDER-ORIENTED DISPOSITIONS

By the end of the nineteenth century, America changed6
from a rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrial one.
Modernization, urbanization, and immigration posed many social problems and a reform movement, the Progressives,
emerged to address them.7 Progressives believed that benevolent state action guided by experts could alleviate social ills;
they created agencies to inculcate their middle-class values and
to assimilate and "Americanize" immigrants and the poor to become virtuous citizens like themselves.
1.

Changing Conception of Children

Changes in family structure and functions accompanied the
economic transformation: Families became more private, women's roles more domestic, and a view of childhood and adolescence as distinct developmental stages emerged.8 Before the
6. See generally G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERvATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1900-1916, at 11-56 (1963); R. WIEBE, THE
SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 11-75 (1967); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE
IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE 1900-1918, at 3-39 (1968).
7. See, e.g., S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE To INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914, at 72-93
(1957); R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BYRAN TO F.D.R. 94-130

(1955).
8. For information on the evolution of the American family, particularly
the roles of women and children, see generally AMERICAN CHILDHOOD (J.
Hawes & N. Hiner eds. 1985); P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 404 (1962);
J. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT
(1977); C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD 6-10 (1977); S. RoTEmAN,
WOMAN'S PROPER PLACE: A HISTORY OF CHANGING IDEALS AND PRACTICES,
1870 TO THE PRESENT (1978); E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 22-54, 168-269 (1975); TURNING POINTS: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS ON THE FAMILY (J. Demos & S. Boocock eds. 1978); B. WISHY, THE CHILD
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past two or three centuries, age was neither the basis for a separate legal status nor for social segregation. Young people were
regarded as miniature adults, small versions of their parents.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, children increasingly were seen as vulnerable, innocent, passive, and dependent beings who needed extended preparation for life. The
newer view of children altered traditional child-rearing practices and imposed a greater responsibility on parents to supervise their children's moral and social development. Many
Progressive reform programs shared a child-centered theme;
the juvenile court, child labor and welfare laws, and compulsory school attendance laws reflected and advanced the changing imagery of childhood. 9
2. Changing Strategies of Social Control
Changes in ideological assumptions about the causes of
crime inspired many Progressive criminal justice reforms.
Although classical criminal law attributed crime to free-willed
actors, positivist criminology regarded crime as determined
rather than chosen. Criminology's attempt to identify the antecedent causes of criminal behavior reduced the actors' moral responsibility and focused 'on reforming offenders rather than
punishing them for their offenses. 10 Applying medical analogies to the treatment of offenders, a growing class of social science professionals fostered the rehabilitative ideal. 1 '
Whether their movement was in fact a humanitarian one to
save poor and immigrant children 2 or intended to expand soAND THE REPUBLIC 115-35, 180-81 (1968); deMause, The Evolution of Childhood,

in THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD 1, 51-54 (L. deMause ed. 1974).
9. See, e.g., L. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRES-

SiSM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 1876-1957, at 127-28 (1961); J. KETT, supra
note 8, at 221-27; S. TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 14-33 (1982); W. TRATTNER, CRUSADE FOR THE
CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMMITTEE AND
CHILD LABOR REFORM IN AMERICA 45-47 (1970); R. WIEBE, supra note 6, at 169.
10. F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 11-15 (1981); D.
MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 5-7 (1964); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 50;
Allen, The Decline of the RehabilitativeIdeal in American Criminal Justice,
27 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 147, 151-53 (1978) [hereinafter Allen, American Criminal
Justice]; Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-28 (1964) [hereinafter Allen, Rehabilitative
Ideal].
11. E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 99-100; Allen, American CriminalJustice, supra note 10, at 154.
12. J. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES 1640-1981, at 122 (1988); Hagan & Leon, Rediscovering Delin-
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cial control over them,' 3 progressive "child-savers" described
juvenile courts as benign, nonpunitive, and therapeutic.
Progressives viewed youthful autonomy as malign; juvenile
court jurisdiction over unruly children reinforced parental authority and allowed state intervention when parents were inadequate for the task.14 The legal doctrine of parens patriae, the
State as parent, legitimated intervention. Juvenile court personnel used informal, discretionary procedures to diagnose the
causes of and prescribe the cures for delinquency. By separating children from adults and providing a rehabilitative alternative to punishment, juvenile courts rejected the jurisprudence
of criminal law and its procedural safeguards, such as juries and
lawyers. Because the court's jurisdiction encompassed youths
suffering from abuse, dependency, or neglect, as well as those
charged with criminal offenses and noncriminal disobedience,
proceedings were characterized as civil rather than criminal.
Theoretically, a child's "best interests," background, and welfare guided dispositions. Because a youth's offense was only a
symptom of her "real" needs, sentences were indeterminate,
nonproportional, and potentially continued for the duration of
minority.

B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOMESTICATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT - PROCEDURAL FORMALITY AND
INDIVIDUALIZED OFFENDER-ORIENTED DISPOSITIONS

The Supreme Court's Gault decision mandated procedural
safeguards in delinquency proceedings and focused initial judicial attention on whether the child committed an offense as a
prerequisite to sentencing.15 In shifting the formal focus of juvenile courts from "real needs" to legal guilt, Gault identified
two crucial disjunctions between juvenile justice rhetoric and
reality: the theory versus practice of rehabilitation, and the differences between the procedural safeguards afforded adults and
those available to juveniles.
In several later decisions, the Court required delinquency
to be proved by the criminal standard "beyond a reasonable
doubt" rather than by lower civil standards of proof, 16 applied
quency: Social History, PoliticalIdeology and the Sociology of Law, 42 AM.

Soc. REV. 587, 597 (1977).
13.

A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS 75-83, 135 (2d ed. 1977); Fox, Juvenile

Justice Reform. An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1218 (1970).
14. A. PLATr, supra note 13, at 135; J. SUTrrroN, supra note 12, at 135.
15. Feld, Punishmen4 Treatment,supra note 3, at 826.
16. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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the ban on double jeopardy to delinquency convictions, 1'7 and
posited a functional equivalence between criminal trials and delinquency proceedings.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,'8 however, the Supreme
Court denied juveniles the constitutional right to jury trials and
halted the extension of full procedural parity with adult criminal prosecutions. The Court feared that jury trials would adversely affect traditional informality, render juvenile courts
procedurally indistinguishable from criminal courts, and call
into question the need for a separate juvenile court. 19 The
McKeiver Court justified the procedural differences between
juvenile and criminal courts on the basis of the former's treatment rationale and the latter's punitive purposes, although it
did not analyze the differences between treatment and punish20
ment that warranted the differences in procedural safeguards.
II.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT

Since those decisions, legislative, judicial, and administrative actions have transformed the juvenile court. Four developments removal of status offenders, waiver of serious
offenders to the adult system, increased punitiveness in sentencing delinquents, and more formal procedures - provide
the impetus for criminalizing the juvenile court. Because these
reforms have not been implemented as intended and have not
had their expected effects, the juvenile court has been transformed but remains unreformed.
A.

JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION OVER NONCRIMINAL
STATUS OFFENDERS

The historical changes in normative assumptions about the
nature of children and the social control of youth resulted in
juvenile court jurisdiction over status offenses. 21 Status jurisdiction allowed intervention to prevent predelinquent misconduct such as disobedience or immorality from escalating into
full-blown criminality.
Although helping troubled children is inherently attractive, the definition and administration of status jurisdiction has
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
403 U.S. 528 (1971).
Id at 550-51.
Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra note 3, at 832-33.
J. KErr, supra note 8, at 256; Fox, supra note 13, at 207-08.
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been criticized extensively in the post-Gault decades. 22 Beginning with the 1967 President's Crime Commission, many professional organizations have advocated reform of status
jurisdiction.2 3 Critics focused on its adverse impact on children,
its disabling effects on families, schools, and other agencies that
refer status offenders to juvenile courts, and the legal and administrative issues it raises for juvenile courts.
Prior to recent reforms, status offenses were a form of delinquency; status delinquents were detained and incarcerated in
the same institutions as criminal delinquents even though they
had committed no crimes.2 Parental referrals overloaded juvenile courts with intractable family disputes, diverted scarce judicial resources from other tasks, and exacerbated rather than
ameliorated family conflict. Social agencies and schools used
the court as a "dumping ground" to impose solutions instead of
addressing the sources of conflict. Judges enjoyed broad discretion to prevent unruliness or immorality from ripening into
crime, and intervention often reflected their values and
prejudices. The exercise of standardless discretion had a disproportionate impact on poor, minority, and female juveniles,23
and raised legal issues of "void for vagueness," equal protection,
26
and procedural justice.
Three recent trends - diversion, deinstitutionalization,
and decriminalization - reflect judicial and legislative disillusionment with the courts' treatment of noncriminal youths and
subsequent efforts to respond to these criticisms. The Federal
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 re22. For information on treatment of status offense by juvenile courts, see
generally BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT (L.
Teitelbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977) [hereinafter BEYOND CONTROL]; STATUS OFFENDERS AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (R. Allinson ed. 1983).
23. See, e.g., T. RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE 56-58 (2nd ed. 1985) (reform pro-

posals included abolishing status jurisdiction entirely; separating noncriminal
from delinquent youths; prohibiting the detention and incarceration of status
offenders with criminal delinquents; and limiting the scope of intervention).
24. I. ScHwARTz, (IN)JUsTICE FOR JUVENIES 4 (1989).
25. Chesney-Lind, Girls and Status Offenses: Is Juvenile Justice Still Sexist?, 20 CRiM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 144, 151-53 (1988); Sussman, Sex-Based Discriminationand the PINS Jurisdiction,in BEYOND CONTROL, supra note 22, at
180-86.
26.

See S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 568 (Me. 1973) (holding that a Maine

statute providing juvenile court jurisdiction over youths "living in circumstances of manifest danger of falling into habits of vice or immorality" was unconstitutionally vague); E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969) (upholding the constitutionality of a Texas statute giving the juvenile

court jurisdiction over a youth who "habitually so deports himself as to injure
or endanger the morals of himself or others"); T. RUnIN, supra note 23, at 62.
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quired states to begin a process of removing noncriminal offenders from secure detention and correctional facilities.2 The
federal and state28 restrictions on commingling status and delinquent offenders in secure institutions provided the impetus
courts and deto divert some status offenders from juvenile
29
carcerate those who remained in the system.
1.

Diversion

Since Gault, virtually every state has redefined its status
jurisdiction. One strategy focuses on providing services on an
informal basis through diversion programs. 30 Just as the original juvenile court diverted youths from adult criminal courts,
now diversion shifts away from juvenile court youths who
would otherwise enter that system. It is questionable whether
diversion programs have been implemented coherently or have
been effective when attempted. 3 ' Theoretically intended to reduce the court's client population, diversion has had the opposite effect of "widening the net of social control. ' 32 The
number of juveniles referred to court remains relatively constant despite a declining youth population, while juveniles who
previously would have been released now are subjected to other
forms of intervention. Diversion provides a rationale for shifting discretion from the core of the juvenile court where it is
subject to a modicum of procedural formality, to its periphery,
operate on an informal pre-Gault basis with
which continues to
33
no accountability.
2.

Deinstitutionalization
The federal and state bans on commingling status and de-

27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5778 (1988) (removal of status offenders from juvenile justice system).
28. In re Ellery C. v. Redlich, 32 N.Y.2d 588, 591, 300 N.E.2d 424, 425, 347

N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (1973) (cannot confine status offenders in same institutions
with delinquents); see, e.g., State ex rel Harris v. Calendine, 160 W. Va. 172,
181, 233 S.E.2d 318, 321 (1977) (removal of status offenders from institutions).
29. Klein, Deinstitutionalizationand Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A
Litany of Impediments, 1 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REv. 145, 146 (1979).
30. Id. at 150.
31. Id. at 157.
32. Id. at 184; Polk, Juvenile Diversion: A Look at the Record, 30 CRIME &
DELINQ. 648, 651 (1984).
33. Effectively, diversion "sanctified and encouraged a strategy for circumventing due process, assured that programs would stay in the discretionary
hands of local officials, and encouraged the privatization of long-term social
control." J. SurrON, supra note 12, at 215.
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linquent offenders in secure institutional confinement led to
the decarceration of noncriminal youths. Although the numbers of status offenders in secure facilities declined somewhat
by the mid-1980s, only a small proportion of status offenders
ever were sent to secure institutions and most remain eligible
for commitment to "forestry camps" and other medium security facilities, albeit with fewer procedural rights than those afforded delinquents. Furthermore, 1980 amendments to the
Federal Juvenile Justice Act weakened even the restrictions on
secure confinement; status offenders who ran away from nonsecure placements or violated valid court orders may be
charged with contempt of court, a delinquent act, and incarcerated.1 Many courts now charge juveniles with minor criminal
offenses instead of status offenses, for which there are no dispositional limits.
3.

Decriminalization

Historically, status offenses were classified as a form of delinquency. Now, almost every state has separated conduct that
is only illegal for children - incorrigibility, runaway, truancy
into new nondelinquency classifications such as Persons or
Children in Need of Supervision (PINS/CHINS). 35 Such label
changes simply shift youths from one jurisdictional category to
another without significantly limiting courts' authority. Using
a label of convenience, former status offenders may be relabeled downward as dependent or neglected youths, upward as
36
delinquent offenders, or laterally into the private sector.
Many former status offenders, especially those who are
middle-class and female, now are shifted into the private
mental health or chemical dependency treatment systems by
diversion, court referral, or voluntary parental commitment.3 7
The Supreme Court in Parham v. J.R 38 ruled that the only
process due to juveniles when parents commit them to secure
treatment facilities is a physician's determination that it is medically appropriate. 39 Although some children's psychological
34.

Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-509 § 11(a)(13),

94 Stat. 2750, 2757 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A) (1988)). See Comment, The Federal Circle Game: The PrecariousConstitutionalStatus of Status Offenders, 7 CoorEY L. REv. 31, 33 (1990).
35. T. RUBIN, supra note 23, at 57.
36. Klein, supra note 29, at 183.
37. I. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 131.

38. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
39. Id. at 607.
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dysfunctions or substance abuse require medical attention,
many commitments result from status-like social or behavioral
conflicts, self-serving parental motives, and medical entrepreneurs coping with underutilized hospitals. With no meaningful
judicial supervision, insurance coverage for inpatient mental
health care, and malleable diagnostic categories, medicalizing
deviance and incarcerating troublesome children is attractive. 4°
Data on commitments to private psychiatric facilities indicate
that the number of juveniles entering the "hidden system" of
social control has increased dramatically as the confinement of
status offenders and nuisance juveniles has declined. 41 Efforts
to deinstitutionalize inadvertently have resulted in "transinstitutionalization," as some juveniles are transferred from publicly funded facilities to private institutions. Whether
incarceration is for their "best interests," for "adjustment reactions" symptomatic of adolescence, or for "chemical dependency," these trends revive the imagery of diagnosis and
treatment on a discretionary basis without regard to formal due
process considerations.
The appropriate response to minor, nuisance, and noncriminal youngsters goes to the heart of the juvenile court's mission
and the normative concept of childhood upon which it is based.
The debate polarizes advocates of authority and control of
youth and those who view intervention as discriminatory and a
denial of rights.4 Although a few states have eliminated status
jurisdiction entirely and allow noncriminal intervention only in
cases of dependency or neglect, juvenile court judges strongly
resist jurisdictional divestiture, because any contraction of their
authority over children leads to further convergence with criminal courts. 43

B.

SENTENCING JUVENILES

Historically, juvenile court sentences were discretionary,
indeterminate, and nonproportional to achieve the offender's
"best interests." The post-Gault era has witnessed a fundamental change in the jurisprudence of sentencing as considerations
of the offense, rather than the offender, dominate the decision.
40. Weithorn, Mental Hospitalizationof Troublesome Youth: An Analysis
of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773, 808 (1988); see also
Schwartz, Jackson-Beeck & Anderson, The Hidden System of Juvenile Control, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 371 (1984) (describing this trend in Minnesota).
41. I. SCHWARTZ, supra note 24, at 136.
42. T. RUBIN, supra note 23, at 58.
43. Klein, supra note 29, at 172.
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A shift in sentencing philosophy from rehabilitation to retribution is evident both in the response to serious juvenile offenders and in the routine sentencing of delinquent offenders.
1.

Waiver of Juvenile Offenders to Criminal Court

Whether persistent or violent young offenders should be
sentenced as juveniles or adults poses difficult theoretical and
practical problems. Relinquishing juvenile court jurisdiction
over a youth represents a choice between sentencing in nominally rehabilitative juvenile courts or in punitive adult criminal
courts. The decision implicates both juvenile court sentencing
practices and the relationship between juvenile and adult court
sentencing practices. Virtually every state has a mechanism for
prosecuting some chronological juveniles as adults." While numerically few, these youths challenge juvenile courts' rehabilitative assumptions and the appropriateness of nonpunitive,
short-term social control. David Brom, the sixteen-year-old
axe-murderer from Rochester, Minnesota, dramatically illus45
trated the problems.
Two types of statutes, judicial waiver and legislative offense exclusion, highlight the differences between juvenile and
criminal courts' sentencing philosophies.46 Because juvenile
courts emphasize individualized treatment of offenders, with
judicial waiver a judge may transfer jurisdiction on a discretionary basis after a hearing to determine whether a youth is amenable to treatment or a threat to public safety. With legislative
offense exclusion, by statutory definition, youths charged with
certain offenses simply are not within juvenile court
jurisdiction.
Judicial waiver's focus on the offender and legislative exclusion's focus on the offense illustrate the contradictions between treatment and punishment. Conceptually, rehabilitation
and retribution are mutually exclusive penal goals. Punishment is retrospective and imposes unpleasant consequences for
past offenses, while therapy is prospective and seeks to improve
44. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 4; Feld, Legislative
Changes, supra note 4, at 472; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult
Prosecution" The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions,
62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 516 (1978) [hereinafter Feld, Reference of Juvenile
Offenders].
45. See Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 4.
46. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 472; Thomas & Bilchik,
ProsecutingJuveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis,
76 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439, 457 (1985).
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offenders' future welfare. 47 Sentences based on the offense are
typically determinate and proportional, 48 while sentences based
49
on the offender are nonproportional and indeterminate.
When youths are transferred to criminal court, legislative exclusion uses the seriousness of the offense to control the adulthood decision whereas judicial waiver relies upon clinical
assessments of amenability to treatment or dangerousness to
decide.
Viewed this way, waiver statutes present the same issues
that indeterminate or determinate sentencing guidelines for
adults raise. In the adult context, determinate sentences based
on just deserts provide an alternative sentencing rationale to
indeterminate sentences.50 Just deserts sentencing emphasizes
equality, uses offense and prior record to define similar cases,
and precludes consideration of individual status or circumstance. 51 By contrast, individualized justice includes all personal characteristics as relevant and relies heavily on
professional discretion to weigh each factor. 52 Proponents of
just deserts reject individualization because treatment programs are ineffective,53 individualization vests broad discretion
in presumed experts who cannot justify treating similarly-situated offenders differently, and clinical subjectivity often produces unequal and unjust results.5
The just deserts sentencing philosophy has influenced sev47. Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 3, at 832; Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Frameworkfor Assessing ConstitutionalRights of Youthful Offenders, 35 VAND. L. REV. 791, 815 (1982).
48. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIM[INAL SANCTION 139-45 (1968);
TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 19 (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 98 (1976)
[hereinafter A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE]; A. VON HRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE
CRIMES 31-46 (1985) [hereinafter A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES].
49. A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, supra note 48, at 39.
50. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 145 (1971);

A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 102; Petersilia & Turner, Guidelinebased Justice: Prediction and Racial Minorities,9 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REV.
151, 155 (1987).
51. D. MATZA, supra note 10, at 113-14.
52. Id. at 114-15.
53. Lab & Whitehead, An Analysis of Juvenile CorrectionalTreatment,34
CRIME & DELINQ. 60, 61 (1988); Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About PrisonReform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22, 47 (1974).
54. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 50, at 124; A. -VON
HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 27; A. VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, supra note 48,

at 5; Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 3, at 832; Feld, Bad Law Makes
Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 15.
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eral states' juvenile waiver and sentencing statutes.5 5 As a critique of discretionary judicial waiver, proponents of just deserts
contend that judges cannot validly or reliably predict clinically
whether a youth will be amenable to treatment or dangerous
and that the standardless discretion they exercise results in inconsistent and discriminatory applications. 56
a.

Judicial Waiver

Judicial waiver embodies the juvenile court's approach to
individualized sentencing. Although two Supreme Court decisions formalized waiver procedures, 57 the substantive bases of
the waiver decision pose the principal difficulties. Asking a
judge to decide whether a youth is amenable or dangerous involves fundamental questions of criminal and juvenile jurisprudence. 58 Although the Progressives assumed that juveniles are
especially amenable to treatment, the question of "what works"
whether rehabilitation programs systematically produce lasting change remains highly controverted. Evaluation research counsels skepticism about the availability of programs
that consistently or systematically rehabilitate adult or serious
juvenile offenders. The general conclusion that "nothing
works" in juvenile or adult corrections has not been persuasively refuted.59 Clearly, some offenders do persist in crime despite treatment and valid and reliable clinical tools are lacking
with which to predict whether a particular individual will be a
recidivist. Similarly, asking a judge to decide whether a youth
poses a threat to public safety requires judges to predict future
55. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 487; Feld, Punishmen
Treatment, supra note 3, at 821-22. See generally D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2
(describing state waiver and sentencing statutes).
56. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 486; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supranote 44, at 534; see also D. FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING
PROOF (1975) (arguing in favor of just deserts).
57. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (prohibition against double
jeopardy requires states to decide whether to proceed against a youth as a juvenile or as an adult before reaching the merits of the case); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 542-43 (1966) (due process safeguards in waiver hearings).
58. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 491; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 44, at 529.
59. See 8 CORREcTIONS AND PUNISHMENT 140 (D. Greenberg ed. 1977); L.
SECHREsT, S. WHITE

& E. BROWN, THE

PHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFEND-

ERs 50-51 (1979) [hereinafter L. SECHREST, S. WHIrE]; Lab & Whitehead, An
Analysis of Juvenile Correctional Treatment, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 60, 77
(1988); Martinson, supra note 53, at 49; Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146, 161 n.84 (1989) (quoting L.
SECHREST, S. WHITE, supra, at 50-51).
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dangerousness even though the technical capacity to clinically
6°
predict future criminal behavior is lacking.
Legislation that focuses on amenability or dangerousness
makes the dubious assumptions that there are effective treatment programs for at least some serious or persistent juvenile
offenders, that clinical tools exist with which to diagnose a particular youth's treatment potential or threat, and that judges
can differentiate among various juveniles. 6 Effectively, judicial
62
waiver statutes give judges broad, standardless discretion.
Although some legislation includes lists of amorphous, subjective, and contradictory factors,6 3 those lists do not guide discretion but rather reinforce it by allowing judges selectively to
emphasize one factor or another to justify any decision.6
Like individualized sentencing, the subjectivity of waiver
decisions produces inequities and disparities. Judges cannot administer discretionary statutes on an evenhanded basis. Within
a single jurisdiction, "justice by geography" prevails as courts
interpret and apply the same law inconsistently.r5 National
evaluations of judicial waiver provide compelling evidence that
it is arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory.6 A youth's race,
as well as geographic locale, affects waiver decisions.6 7 Idiosyncratic differences in judicial philosophy or the location of the
hearing are more important than the nature of the crime. In
60. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRmONMENT 62 (1974).
61. Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the
Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195, 198 (1983) [hereinafter Feld, Delinquent Careers]; Feld, Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 3, at

179.
62. Such legislation is the juvenile equivalent of the capital punishment
statutes condemned by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,

240 (1972).
63. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966); Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudenceof Waiver, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING 195 (1982).
64. TwENTIET CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY To-

WARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUNG CRIME 56 (1978) [hereinafter
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE].
65. D. HAmPARIAN, L. ESTEP, S. MUNTEAN, R. PRIESTINO, R. SwIsHER, P.
WALLACE & J. WHITE, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS 22 (1982) [hereinafter D.
HAMPARIAN, L. ESTEP]; Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 2546; Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 492; Feld, Reference of Juvenile
Offenders, supra note 44, at 546.
66. D. HAMPARIAN, L. ESTEP, supra note 65, at 104.
67. Fagan, Forst & Vivona, Racial Determinants of the JudicialTransfer
Decision: ProsecutingViolent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQ.
259, 263 (1987).
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short, judicial waiver exhibits all the characteristic defects of
discretionary sentencing.
Ultimately, waiver involves the appropriate disposition of
offenders who chronologically happen to be juveniles. The distinction between treatment as a juvenile and punishment as an
adult is based on an arbitrary line that has no criminological
significance other than its legal consequences. There is a strong
relationship between age and crime; crime rates for many offenses peak in mid- to late-adolescence. 68 Rational sentencing
requires a coordinated response to young offenders on both
sides of the juvenile/adult line using a standardized means to
69
identify and sanction serious young criminals.
Because young people are not irresponsible children one
day and responsible adults the next, except as a matter of law,
juvenile and adult courts pursue inconsistent sentencing goals.
A "punishment gap" occurs when juveniles make the transition
to criminal courts. Most juveniles judicially waived are charged
with property crimes like burglary, and not with serious offenses against the person. When they appear in criminal courts
as adult first-offenders, typically they are not imprisoned. 70 Because prior records cumulate, criminal courts sentence older offenders more severely when their rate of criminal activity is
declining and sentence younger offenders more leniently even
68. Greenwood, Differences in Criminal Behavior and Court Responses
Among Juvenile and Young Adult Defendants, 7 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REV.
151, 153-54 (1986); Petersilia, Criminal Career Research.- A Review of Recent
Evidence, 2 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REv. 321, 358 (1980).
69.

Chronic offenders are disproportionately involved in criminal activity,

committing their first offenses in their early to mid-teens, persisting in criminal activity into their twenties, and then gradually reducing their criminal involvement. Greenwood, supra note 68, at 163.
70. P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERSIUA & F. ZndIMNG, AGE, CRIME, AND SANCTIONS: THE TRANSITION FROM JUVENILE TO ADULT COURT 32-39 (1980) [hereinafter P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERsILA]; D. HAMPARIAN, L. ESTEP, supra note 65,
at 112. But see P. GREENWOOD, A. ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS 56 (1984) (arguing
young adults are sentenced as severely as other offenders). The failure to intervene most strongly in the lives of chronic and active young criminal offenders occurs because of qualitative differences in the nature of juveniles'
offenses, differences between the criteria for juvenile court removal and criminal court sentences, and the failure to integrate juvenile and adult criminal
records for sentencing purposes. P. GREENWOOD, J. PETERSILIA, supra, at ixxii.

Even within comparable crime categories, age-related patterns of offending affect criminal sentencing. Young offenders are less likely than adults to
be armed with guns, to inflict as much injury, or to steal as much property. Id.
at vi.
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though they are at the peak of their criminal careers. 71
Although the differences between juvenile and adult
courts' sentencing practices work at cross-purposes when
youths make the transition, judicial waiver serves important
political and organizational functions for juvenile courts. By relinquishing a small fraction of its clientele and portraying these
juveniles as the most intractable and dangerous in the system,
juvenile courts create symbolic scapegoats, appear to protect
the public, preserve their jurisdiction over the vast bulk of
72
juveniles, and deflect more comprehensive criticisms.
b. Legislative Exclusion of Offenses
In contrast to judicial waiver, legislative waiver simply excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction youths charged with certain offenses. 73 Because legislatures create juvenile courts,
legislatures may modify the courts' jurisdictions as they please.
Legislatures often fail to make explicit their sentencing goals
74
when they require some youths to be prosecuted as adults.
Defining adulthood entails a value choice about the quantity
and quality of crime that will be tolerated before punishment is
mandated.75 Exclusion could be justified if the minimum pe71. Boland, FightingCrime: The Problem of Adolescents, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 94, 96 (1980); Feld, Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra
note 3, at 233-37.
72. Bortner, TraditionalRhetoric, OrganizationalRealities: Removal of
Juvenile to Adult Court, 32 CRImE & DELINQ. 53, 69-70 (1980); Feld, Legislative
Changes, supra note 4, at 493-94; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra
note 44, at 546.
73. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 494.
74. A legislature must recognize the sentencing goals it seeks in order to
translate jurisprudential criteria into waiver legislation. A legislature seeking
retribution could conclude that older youths who commit heinous offenses deserve to be treated as adults. A legislature seeking to selectively incapacitate
chronic offenders must emphasize cumulative persistence, however, because a
first offense, even if a serious one, does not provide a basis for distinguishing
between those who will or will not re-offend. D. HAMPARIAN, R. ScHUSTER, S.
DINrTz & J. CONRAD, THE VIOLENT FEw 102 (1978); M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO
& T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 87-88 (1972) [hereinafter M.

WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO]. The most reliable indicator of the likelihood of future
criminality is the number of prior contacts a youth has with police and the
courts. Greenwood, supra note 68, at 164. Although most youths desist after
one or two contacts, the small group of chronic offenders continue to commit
delinquent acts. M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, supra, at 88; Petersilia, supra note
68, at 369.
75. A legislature also needs to establish a minimum age for criminal liability for excluded offenders - sixteen, fifteen, or fourteen. At what age is it
appropriate to hold a juvenile as responsible for a serious crime as an
eighteen-year-old adult?
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riod of appropriate confinement exceeds the maximum sentence available to a juvenile court.76 For example, sixteen-yearold David Brom, convicted of four murders, could not be confined "long enough" if sentenced as a juvenile.
Yet community protection is enhanced, deterrence increased, and fundamental norms reaffirmed only if longer adult
sentences actually are imposed consistently. Using the present
offense and prior record to structure waiver decisions rather
than amorphous clinical considerations can integrate juvenile
and adult sentencing practices and enable criminal courts
to
77
sentence violent or chronic juveniles more consistently.
Within the past decade, just deserts rather than clinical as78
sessments has come to dominate this sentencing decision.
Legislatures use offense criteria either as dispositional guidelines in judicial waiver to limit discretion and improve the fit
between waiver decisions and criminal court sentencing practices, or to automatically exclude certain youths.7 9 More than
twenty states have amended their judicial waiver statutes to reduce their inconsistency and to reconcile the contradictions between juvenile and adult sentencing practices.8 0 Some states
specify that only serious offenses such as murder, rape, or robbery may be waived.8 ' Restricting waiver to serious offenses
There is no compelling or convincing evidence that persons aged sixteen to eighteen differ significantly from persons aged eighteen and
over in their capacity to understand the outcomes and consequences
of their acts.... [S]erious crime should be treated seriously regardless
of the offender's age.
TWENTH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 25 (Wolfgang,
dissenting).
76.

As one commentator explained:

[T]he justification for waiver is singular* transfer to criminal court is
necessary when the maximum punishment available in juvenile court
is clearly inadequate ....

[Tihe standard for making a -waiver deci-

sion is a determination that the maximum social control available in
juvenile court falls far short of the minimum social control necessary

if a particular offender is guilty of the serious crime he is charged
with.
Zimring, supra note 63, at 201.
77. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases, supra note 4, at 96-99; Feld, Delinquent Careers,supra note 61, at 208-10; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders,
supra note 44, at 572.
78. Feld, Legislative Changes,supra note 4, at 487. See generallyD. ROTHMAN, supra note 2 (describing the emergence of the just deserts sentencing
philosophy).
79. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 504.
80. Id. at 508.
81. Legislatures also use offense criteria to modify waiver procedures,

making transfer hearings mandatory if one of the enumerated offenses is
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limits judicial discretion and increases the likelihood that significant adult sanctions will be imposed if waiver is ordered.
More importantly, about half of the states have rejected, at
least in part, the juvenile court's individualized sentencing philosophy, emphasized policies of retribution or incapacitation,
and excluded youths charged with serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction.8 2 Although some states only exclude
youths charged with capital crimes, murder, or offenses punishable by life imprisonment, others exclude longer lists of offenses such as rape or armed robbery.8 3 Regardless of the
details, these statutes remove judicial sentencing discretion entirely and base the decision to try a youth as an adult exclusively on the offense. These statutes provide one indicator of
the shift from an individualized treatment sentencing philosophy in juvenile court to a more retributive one, and reflect legislative distrust of judges' exercises of discretion. Using
offenses to structure or eliminate judicial discretion repudiates
rehabilitation, narrows juvenile court jurisdiction, reduces its
clientele, and denies it the opportunity even to try to treat certain youths.
Punishment in Juvenile Courts - Offense-Based
Sentencing Practices
States apply principles of just deserts to the routine sentencing of juveniles as well as to waiver.8 4 The McKeiver Court
rejected procedural equality between juveniles and adults because juvenile courts purportedly treated rather than punished
youths. Increasingly, however, juvenile courts pursue the sub2.

stantive goals of criminal law.8 5 Courts and legislatures use of-

fense criteria to regulate sentencing because individualization
neither reduces recidivism nor provides a principled basis for
coercive intervention. Moreover, it produces unequal results
among similarly situated offenders and punishes minor offend86
ers excessively and serious ones leniently.
alleged or shifting to the juvenile the burden of proof to establish his or her
amenability to treatment, rather than to require the state to prove
nonamenability. Id. at 508-09.
82. Id at 511.
83. Id. Still others exclude youths charged with repeat offenses, or supplement judicial waiver provisions with offense exclusions.
84. Feld, Punishmen4 Treatment, supra note 3, at 832-96.
85. See id.
86. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERv. COMM., supra note 50, at 124-44; A. VON
HIRSCH, CRIMEs, supra note 48, at 171-74; A. VON HIRSCH, JUSTICE, supra note
48, at 29-32; Cohen, Juvenile Offenders: Proportionality vs. Treatment,

1991]

JUVEILE SENTENCING

An examination of legislative purpose clauses, juvenile
court sentencing statutes and actual sentencing practices, and
conditions of institutional confinement consistently reveals that
8 7
treating juveniles closely resembles punishing adult criminals.
Punishing juveniles, however, has constitutional consequences,
because the McKeiver Court posited a therapeutic juvenile
court as the justification for its procedural differences.
a.

The Purpose of the Juvenile Court
Forty-two states' juvenile codes contain a statement of leg-

88
islative purpose to aid courts in interpreting the legislation.

Since the creation of the original juvenile court in 1899, the
traditional purpose has been "to secure for each minor... such
care and guidance . . . as will serve the moral, emotional,
mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community."8 9 In the past decade, about one-quarter
of the states have redefined their courts' purposes.9° These
amendments de-emphasize rehabilitation and the child's "best
interests," and emphasize the importance of protecting public
safety,9 ' enforcing children's obligations to society, 92 applying
sanctions consistent with the seriousness of the offense,93 and
rendering appropriate punishment to offenders.9 For example,
CHILDREN'S RTs. REP., May 1978, at 1, 2; Feld, Punishmen Treatment,supra
note 3, at 836 n.6.
87. Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 519; Feld, Punishmen
Treatment,supra note 3, at 889-91.
88. Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra note 3, at 842 n.83 (listing
statutes).
89. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 1 801-2 (Smith-Hurd 1990). Many juvenile
codes supplement that original statement of purpose with the additional goal
of removing "the taint of criminality and the penal consequences of criminal
behavior, by substituting therefore an individual program of counselling, supervision, treatment, and rehabilitation." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:1 II
(Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01 (Anderson 1990); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-101 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 631 (1981).
90. Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra note 3, at 842 n.84 (listing
statutes).
91. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(a) (West Supp. 1990) ("provide for the
protection and safety of the public"); see also PRIVATE SECTOR TASK FORCE ON
JUVENILE JusTICE, FINAL REPORT iii (1987) [hereinafter PRIVATE SECTOR TASK
FORCE].

92. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-1-1 (Burns 1987) ("protect the public by enforcing the legal obligations children have to society").
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2)(a) (West 1988) ("protect society . . .
[while] recognizing that the application of sanctions which are consistent with
the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all cases").
94. HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1985). See generally Walkover, The Infancy
Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 523-28 (1984).
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the purpose of Minnesota's juvenile courts now is "to promote
the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful
behavior."9 5
Courts recognize that these changes in purpose clauses signal a basic philosophical reorientation, even as they approve
punishment in juvenile courts.9 The state of Washington
adopted a juvenile code that emphasizes just deserts rather
than treatment.9 7 Confronted with a request for a jury trial,
the Washington Supreme Court reasoned that sometimes punishment is treatment and held that "accountability for criminal
behavior, the prior criminal activity and punishment commensurate with age, crime and criminal history does as much to rehabilitate ... an errant youth as does the prior philosophy of
focusing upon ... characteristics of the individual juvenile."98s
Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court endorsed punishment,
stating that "[b]y formally recognizing the legitimacy of punitive and deterrent sanctions for criminal offenses juvenile
courts will be properly and somewhat belatedly expressing society's firm disapproval of juvenile crime and will be clearly issuing a threat of punishment for criminal acts to the juvenile
population." 9 9
b.

Just Deserts Dispositions- Legislative and
Administrative Changes in Juvenile Courts'
Sentencing Framework

Sentencing statutes provide another indicator of whether a
juvenile court is punishing or treating delinquents. Originally,
juvenile court sentences were indeterminate and nonproportional to achieve the child's "best interests." Although most juvenile sentencing statutes mirror their Progressive origins,
95. MINN. STAT. § 260.011(2)(c) (1990).
96. In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 433
N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1988); State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 165 W. Va. 448, 456-59,
269 S.E.2d 401, 408-09 (1980).
97. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (Supp. 1990); see also Becker,
Washington State's New Juvenile Code: An Introduction, 14 GONZ. L. RrV.
289, 307-08 (1979) (part of symposium on the revised Washington juvenile
code); Feld, Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 3, at 200-03;
Walkover, supra note 94, at 528-33.
98. State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 652, 656-57, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (1979); see
also State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 16-17, 743 P.2d 240, 247 (1987) (changes in
the Juvenile Justice Act did not require recognition of right to jury trial).
99. In re Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 432, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (1983).
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even states that use indeterminate sentences emphasize the offense as a dispositional constraint. Several states instruct
judges to consider the seriousness of the offense and the child's
culpability, age, and prior record when imposing a sentence.1c °
i. Determinate Sentences in Juvenile Court
Despite the court's history of indeterminate sentencing,
about one-third of the states now use the present offense and
prior record to regulate at least some sentencing decisions
through determinate or mandatory minimum sentencing statutes or correctional administrative guidelines. 10 1 The clearest
departure from traditional juvenile court sentencing practices
occurred in 1977 when Washington state enacted just deserts
legislation that based presumptive sentences on a youth's age,
present offense, and prior record. 10 2 In New Jersey, juvenile
court judges consider offense, criminal history, and statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors when sentencing juveniles,
and enhance sentences for serious or repeat offenders. 0 3 Texas
uses determinate sentences for juveniles charged with serious
offenses.'14
ii. Mandatory Minimum Terms of Confinement Based on
Offense
Several states impose mandatory minimum sentences for
certain offenses such as "designated felonies."'1 5 Some
mandatory minimum statutes give judges discretion whether or
not to institutionalize a juvenile, and prescribe the minimum
term only if incarceration is ordered. 10 6 Other mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are nondiscretionary, and the court
100. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-646 (1989) ("appropriate to the seriousness
of the offense, the degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the
particular case and the age and prior record of the juvenile").
101. See Feld, Punishmen4 Treatment, supra note 3, at 850-62 (Table I and
discussion).
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-43(a) (West Supp. 1990).
104. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
105. E.g., Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (Anderson 1990); N.Y. FAM.CT.
Acr §§ 301.2(8)-(9), 352.2, 353.5 (McKinney Supp. 1990). For a comprehensive
comparison of state juvenile codes, see Feld, Punishmen4 Treatment, supra
note 3, at 862-79 (Table I and discussion).
106. E.g., COLO.REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-113, -113.1, -113.2 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 208.194 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1 (Supp.
1990).
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must commit the youth for the minimum period. 107 Nondiscretionary mandatory minimum terms apply for serious, violent,10 8
or repeated offenses.'09 These therapeutic sentencing laws are
addressed to "violent and repeat offenders," "aggravated juvenile offenders," "serious juvenile offenders," or "designated
felons."" 0 These statutes prescribe the level of security and
the length of confinement, which may range from twelve to
eighteen months,"'- to age twenty-one, 1 2 or to the adult term
for the same offense." 3 Basing mandatory minimum sentences
on the offense precludes any individualized consideration of the
offender's "real needs."
iii. Administrative Sentencing and Parole Release
Guidelines
Another form of just deserts sentencing appears in the
adoption by several states' department of corrections of offense
guidelines to structure institutional confinement and release
decisions. While adult prison and parole authorities have used
guidelines for decades, their use for juveniles is more recent.
Minnesota's Department of Corrections adopted determinate
"length of stay" guidelines based on the present offense and
other "risk" factors. 114 The juvenile risk factors are the same
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937 (Supp. 1988).
E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, %
805-35 (Smith-Hurd 1990); N.Y. FAM. CT.
AcT §§ 301.2(8)-(9), 352.2, 353.5 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
109. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937 (Supp. 1988).
110. Colorado uses special provisions for sentencing "violent" and "repeat
107.
108.

juvenile offenders," "mandatory sentence offenders," and "aggravated juvenile
offenders" that include mandatory minimum out of home placements. COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-113, -113.1, -113.2 (1986). "[S]erious juvenile offenders" in
Connecticut receive offense-based sentences which include mandatory minimum out-of-home placement. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-141(a) (1989).
"[D]esignated felony" legislation in Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-37 (Supp.
1989), and New York, N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 301.2(8)-(9), 352.2, 353.5 (McKinney Supp. 1990), prescribes the length of confinement and level of security for
juveniles convicted of enumerated offenses and includes provisions for nondiscretionary mandatory sentences. Seven other states impose mandatory
minimum sentences on serious or repeat juvenile offenders. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 937 (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 805-35 (Smith-Hurd 1990); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 208.194 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A652(b)(2) (1987); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (Anderson 1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-137 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1 (Supp. 1990).
111. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-37 (Supp 1989).
112. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 1 805-35 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
113. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208F.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (repealed 1984).
114. See MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, JUVENILE RELEASE GUIDELINES 3-8 (1980).
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as those used in Minnesota's Adult Sentencing Guidelines that
are designed to achieve just deserts." 5 Georgia" 6 and Arizonam7 employ administrative guidelines that use offense categories to specify proportional mandatory minimum terms.
Juveniles committed to the California Youth Authority are released by a Parole Board that uses offense guidelines to establish release eligibility."18
c. EmpiricalEvaluationsof Juvenile Court Sentencing
Practices
Juvenile court judges decide what to do with a child, in
part, by reference to statutory mandates. Practical bureaucratic considerations influence their decisions as well.119 Because of paternalistic assumptions about children and the need
to look beyond the present offense to their "best interests,"
judges enjoy greater discretion than do their adult-court
2 0
counterparts.
The exercise of broad discretion associated with individualized justice raises concerns about its discriminatory impact.' 2 1
Poor and minority youths are disproportionately over-repre115. Feld, Punishmen Treatment, supra note 3, at 874; see MINN. STAT.
ANN.§ 244 app. 1.2., II.B. (West Supp. 1991) (Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
and Commentary).
116. M. FORST, E. FRIEDMAN & R. COATES, INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT
AND RELEASE DECISION-MIAKING FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE APPROACHES, GEORGIA - A CASE
STUDY 9-11 (URSA Inst. 1985).
117. ARIZONA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, LENGTH OF CONFINEMENT GUIDELINES FOR JUVENILES (1986).
118. CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURT PRACTICE § 10.14-.16 (1981) (outlining

parole guidelines based on the severity of offense).
119. See M. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT 38-58 (1982); A. CICOUREL,
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 292-327 (1968); R. EMERSON,
JUDGING DELINQUENTS 29-56 (1969).
120. See M. BORTNER, supra note 120, at 243 (discussing the broad sentencing discretion afforded juvenile court judges); Barton, DiscretionaryDecisionMaking in Juvenile Justice, 22 CRIME & DELiNQ. 470, 471 (1976) (discussing

the paternalistic assumptions underlying the juvenile court treatment ideal).
121. See Dannefer & Schutt, Race and Juvenile Justice Processingin Court
and Police Agencies, 87 AM. J. Soc. 1113, 1129-30 (1982); Fagan, Slaughter &
Hartstone, Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile Justice Process,
33 CRIME & DELINQ. 224, 250-51 (1987) [hereinafter Fagan, Slaughter]; Krisberg, Schwartz, Fishman, Eisikovits, Guttman & Joe, The Incarcerationof Minority Youth, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 173, 200 (1987) [hereinafter Krisberg,
Schwartz]; McCarthy & Smith, The Conceptualization of Discriminationin
the Juvenile Justice Process: The Impact of Administrative Factors and
Screening Decisions on Juvenile Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41, 58
(1986); Pope & Feyerherm, Minority Status and Juvenile Justice Processing:
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sented in juvenile correctional institutions.122 Does basing discretionary sentences on social characteristics or race rather
than legal variables result in differential processing and more
severe sentencing of minority youths? 2 3 Or, despite the theoretical commitment to individualized justice, are sentences
based on offenses, and does the racial disproportionality result
from real differences in rates of offending by race?12A In short,
to what extent do legal, offense or social variables influence juvenile court judges' sentencing decisions?
Although evaluations of juvenile court sentencing practices
are sometimes contradictory,25 two general findings emerge.
First, the present offense and prior record account for most of
the variation in sentencing that can be explained.2 6 Second, after controlling for offense variables, individualized discretion is
often synonymous with racial disparities in sentencing12T
Practical bureaucratic considerations provide an impetus to
base sentences on the offense. The desire to avoid scandals and
unfavorable political and media attention constrains juvenile
court judges to impose more formal and restrictive sentences
An Assessment of the Research Literature (pt. 2), 22 Crm. JUST. ABSTRACTS
527, 528 (1990).
122. See Krisberg, Schwartz, supra note 121, at 174.
123. See id. at 200; Fagan, Slaughter, supra note 121, at 250; McCarthy &
Smith, supra note 121, at 58.
124. See M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO, supra note 74, at 248; Hindelang, Race
and Involvement in Common Law PersonalCrimes, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 93, 10306 (1978). But see Huizinga & Elliott, Juvenile Offenders: Prevalence, Offender Incidence, and Arrest Rates by Race, 33 CRIME & DEUNQ. 206, 221
(1987) (difference in incarceration rates cannot be explained by differing rates
of offending).
125. See Fagan, Slaughter, supra note 121, at 225; McCarthy & Smith,
supra note 121, at 41.
126. See Clarke & Koch, Juvenile Court" Therapy or Crime Control, and
Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 263, 276-86 (1980);
Horowitz & Wasserman, Some Misleading Conceptions in Sentencing Research: An Example and Reformulation in the Juvenile Court, 18 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 416 (1980); McCarthy & Smith, supra note 121, at 52; see also Barton,
supra note 120, at 476-77 (prior record and present offense, second and first
most important dispositional criteria, respectively); Feld, The Right to Counsel
in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the
Difference They Make, 79 J. CRim.

L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1224-32 (1989)

(past record and present offense have the highest correlations of any variables
with disposition decisions); Phillips & Dinitz, Labelling and Juvenile Court
Dispositions: Official Responses to a Cohort of Violent Juveniles, 23 Soc. Q.
267, 276 (1982) (same).
127. See Fagan, Slaughter, supra note 121, at 241-50; Krisberg, Schwartz,
supra note 121, at 194; McCarthy & Smith, supra note 121, at 53-61; Pope &
Feyerherm, supra note 121, at 528.
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on more serious delinquents.123 Moreover, organizations that
pursue contradictory goals must develop bureaucratic strategies
to simplify individualized assessments.12 9 Because juvenile
courts routinely collect information about present offenses and
prior records, such data provide bases for decisions. Despite
claims of individualization, juvenile and adult sentencing practices are more similar in their emphasis on present offense and
prior record than their statutory language suggests. 30
Although there is a relationship between offenses and dispositions, most of the variation in sentencing juveniles remains
unexplained.' 3 ' The recent statutory changes reflect legislative
disquiet with the underlying premises of individualized justice,
the idiosyncratic
exercises of discretion, and the inequalities
32
that result.

d. Conditions of Juvenile Confinement
Another way to determine whether juvenile courts are
punishing or treating young offenders is to examine the correctional facilities to which they are sent. It was the deplorable
conditions of confinement that motivated the Court in Gault to
insist upon minimal procedural safeguards for juveniles.'3
Since their inception, the reality of custodial institutions has
contradicted the juvenile court's rhetorical commitment to rehabilitation. Historical studies of Progressive juvenile correctional programs provide dismal accounts of training schools and
institutions that were scarcely distinguishable from their adult
penal counterparts134
128. See A. CIcoUREL, supra note 119, at 170-242; R. EMERSON, supra note
119, at 29-56; D. MATZA, supra note 10, at 120-23; Bortner, supra note 72, at 6871.
129. See D. MATZA, supra note 10, at 120-22; Marshall & Thomas, DiscretionaryDecision-Makingand the Juvenile Court, 34 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 47, 5556 (1983).
130. P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, .A. ABRAHAMsE & F. ZIMRING, YouTm
CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 51 (Rand Report No. 3016-CSA,
1983) [hereinafter P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSoN].
131. See Horowitz & Wasserman, supra note 126, at 416; Thomas & Fitch,
An Inquiry Into the Association Between Respondents' PersonalCharacteristics and Juvenile Court Dispositions,17 WM. & MARY L. REv. 61, 75, 82 (1975).
132. See Feld, Legislative Changes, supra note 4, at 487; Feld, Punishmen
Treatment,supra note 3, at 836, 852.
133. 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
134. See D. RoTHMA, supra note 2, at 261-89; S. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND
THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT:

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE"
JUVENILE JUSTICE 1825-1920, at 81-123 (1977). The juvenile court's lineage of

punitive confinement in the name of rehabilitation can be traced to its institu-
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Inadequate correctional programs are not simply historical
artifacts. Contemporary evaluations of juvenile institutions reveal a continuing gap between rehabilitative rhetoric and punitive reality.135 Research in Massachusetts describes violent and
punitive institutions in which staff physically abused inmates
38
and were frequently powerless to prevent inmate violence.
Several studies in other jurisdictions report similar staff and in137
mate violence, physical abuse, and degrading make-work.
The daily reality for juveniles confined in many so-called treatment facilities is one of violence, predatory behavior, and punitive incarceration.
Coinciding with these post-Gaultevaluations, lawsuits challenged conditions of confinement, alleged that they violated inmates' "right to treatment" and inflicted "cruel and unusual
punishment," and provided another outside view of juvenile
corrections. 138 Federal judges found that staff routinely beat
juveniles with fraternity paddles, injected them with psychotropic drugs for social control purposes, and deprived them of
minimally adequate care or individualized treatment.139 Other
courts found numerous instances of physical abuse, staff-administered beating and tear-gassing, homosexual assaults, extended
solitary confinement in dungeon-like cells, repetitive and degrading make-work, and minimal clinical services. 140 Unfortunately, these cases are not atypical, as the many decisions
tional precursor, the House of Refuge. See J. HAWES, CHILDREN IN URBAN SOCIEY: JUVENILE DELiNQUENCY IN 19TH CENTuRY AMERICA 27-60 (1971); R.
MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTs IN THE UNITED
STATES 1825-1840, at 83, 86 (1973); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEw REPUBLIC 221-36 (1971).
135. See C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER & S. DINITz, JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION
17-31 (1976) [hereinafter C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER]; B. FELD, NEUTRALIZING
INMATE VIOLENCE 62-64 (1977); S. LERNER, BODILY HARM: THE PATTERN OF
FEAR AND VIOLENCE AT THE CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY 11-46 (1986); Feld,

A ComparativeAnalysis of OrganizationalStructure and Inmate Subcultures
in Institutesfor Juvenile Offenders, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 336, 346-61 (1981).
136. See B. FELD, supra note 135, at 62-64; Feld, supra note 135, at 346-47,
361.
137. See C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER, supra note 135, at 33-47; Guggenheim, A
Call to Abolish the Juvenile Justice System, CHILDREN'S RTS.REP., June 1978,
at 6-8. A recent review of California Youth Authority (CYA) institutions concluded that "a young man... cannot pay his debt to society safely. The hard
truth is that the CYA staff cannot protect its inmates from being beaten or
intimidated by other prisoners." S. LERNER, supra note 135, at 12.
138. Feld, supra note 2, at 142.
139. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354-60 (5th Cir. 1974).
140. Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864, 867-69 (5th Cir. 1976); Inmates of
Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1358-65 (D.R.I. 1972).
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documenting inhumane conditions in juvenile institutions and
even adult jails where juveniles also are held demonstrate. 141
Rehabilitative euphemisms such as "providing a structured environment" cannot disguise the punitive reality of juvenile confinement. Although juvenile institutions are not as uniformly
bad as adult prisons, the prevalence of violence, aggression, and
homosexual rape in juvenile facilities is hardly consoling. 14
Evaluations of these rehabilitation programs provide scant sup143
port for their effectiveness.
3.

Summary of Changes in Juvenile Court Sentencing
Practices

A strong, nationwide movement, both in theory and in
practice, is repudiating therapeutic, individualized dispositions
in favor of punitive sentences. When the Court decided McKeiver in 1971, no states used determinate or mandatory minimum sentences or administrative guidelines. In the middle to
1 and selate 1970s, several states adopted "designated felony"'"
45
146
rious offender' laws and sentencing guidelines.
Since 1980,
at least eleven more states have adopted determinate or
mandatory minimum sentence laws or administrative guidelines, so that now about one-third of the states explicitly use
punitive sentencing strategies. 14 7 These formal changes and actual practices eliminate most of the differences between juvenile and adult sentencing. Imposing mandatory or determinate
sentences on the basis of offense and prior record contradicts
any therapeutic purposes and precludes consideration of a
youth's "real needs." Revised juvenile purpose clauses and
court decisions eliminate even rhetorical support for rehabilitation. As a result, "the purposes of the juvenile process have become more punitive, its procedures formalistic, adversarial and
public, and the consequences of conviction much more
141. Krisberg, Schwartz, Lisky & Austin, The Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 5, 30-36 (1986); Soler, Litigation on Behalfof
Children in Adult Jails,34 CRIME & DELNQ. 190, 194-97 (1988).
142. C. BARTOLLAS, S. M.LER, supra note 135, at 73-83; B. FELD, supra
note 135, at 131-38.
143. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
144. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(8)-(9) (Consol. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 208.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1988) (repealed 1989).
145. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-1-103(28), (23.5), (19.5), (2.1), 19-3-113, -113.1
(1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-141(a) (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37

(1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-652(b)(1)-(2) (1989).
146.

WASH. REV. CODE § 13A0.0357 (Supp. 1990).

147. Feld, Punishment Treatment, supra note 3, at 842-87.
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harsh. ' 148 All these changes repudiate the original assumptions
that juvenile courts operate in a child's "best interests," that
youths should be treated differently than adults, and that rehaprocess that cannot be limited by
bilitation is an indeterminate
149
fixed-time punishment.
C. THE PROCEDURAL CONVERGENCE BETWEEN JUVENILE AND
CRIMINAL COURTS

These changes contradict the McKeiver Court's premise
that therapeutic juvenile dispositions require fewer procedural
safeguards and raise questions that the Court avoided about the
quality of justice. Since Gault, the formal procedures of juvenile and criminal courts have converged. 150 There remains,
however, a substantial gulf between theory and reality, between the law on the books and the law in action. Theoretically, delinquents are entitled to formal trials and the
assistance of counsel. In actuality, the quality of procedural
justice is far different. More than two decades ago, the
Supreme Court decried that "the child receives the worst of
both worlds: .

.

. he gets neither the protections accorded to

adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."' 151 Despite the criminalizing of juvenile
courts, most states provide neither special procedures to protect
juveniles from their own immaturity nor the full panoply of
adult procedural safeguards. Instead, states treat juveniles just
like adult criminal defendants when equality redounds to their
disadvantage and use less adequate juvenile court safeguards
when those deficient procedures provide an advantage to the
152
state.
1.

Jury Trials in Juvenile Court

The right to a jury trial and the assistance of counsel are
two critical procedural safeguards when sentences are punitive
rather than therapeutic. In denying juveniles a jury trial, the
148. In re Javier A., 159 Cal. App. 3d 913, 963-64, 206 Cal. Rptr. 386, 421
(1984).
149. See R. COATES, M. FORST & B. FISHER, INSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT
AND RELEASE DECISION-MAKING FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE APPROACHES - A CROSS STATE

ANALYSIS 1-3 (1985).

150. Feld, supra note 2, at 141-42; see Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An

HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187, 1187-88 (1970).
151. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 596 (1966).
152. Feld, supra note 2, at 141-42.
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McKeiver Court posited virtual parity between the factual accuracy of juvenile and adult adjudications. But juries provide special protections to ensure factual accuracy and acquit more
readily than do judges. 1 53 Based on the same evidence, it is easier to convict a youth appearing before a judge in juvenile court
than it would be to convict before a jury in a criminal
proceeding. 154
Moreover, McKeiver simply ignored that constitutional
procedures also prevent governmental oppression. 5 5 In
Duncan v. Louisiana,156 the Court held that adult criminal proceedings required a jury to assure both factual accuracy and
protection against governmental oppression. Duncan emphasized that juries protect against a weak or biased judge, inject
the community's values into law, and increase the visibility and
accountability of justice administration. 157 These protective
functions are even more crucial in juvenile courts that labor behind closed doors, immune from public scrutiny.
Few of the states that sentence juveniles punitively provide
158
jury trials; several have rejected constitutional challenges.
Even in states where juries are available in the juvenile court,
their symbolic significance far outweighs their practical impact
because they are seldom used.15 9 As a symbol, the jury requires
candor and honesty about the punishment that is imposed in
the name of treatment and the need to protect against even benevolent governmental coercion. Rehabilitation is an expansive
concept that widens nets of social control and promotes abuse
through self-delusion.160 Punishment, by contrast, frankly ac153. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 43-44 (1966). Guilt is
not just a factual determination but an assessment of culpability; juries provide the nexus between statutory language and the community's sense of justice in applying the law to the facts of a particular case. Feld, supra note 2, at
245 n.402.
154. P. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, supra note 130, at 29-54; Feld, supra note 2,
at 245 n.400.

155. Feld, supra note 2, at 244; Feld, Punishmen Treatment,supra note 3,
at 832-33.

156. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
157. Id. at 150-55.
158. The increased punitiveness of juvenile justice raises a dilemma of constitutional dimensions: "Is it fair, in the constitutional sense, to expose minors
to adult sanctions for crimes, without granting them the same due process
rights as adults?" PRIVATE SECTOR TASK FORCE, supra note 91, at 6.
159. Note, The PublicRight of Access to Juvenile DelinquencyHearings, 81
MIcH. L. REv. 1540, 1553 (1983).
160. Allen, Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 10, at 32-35; see Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)- (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Experience
should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the govern-
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knowledges that coercion is harmful and requires proportional
161
limits and procedural protections.
2.

The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court

Procedural justice hinges on access to and the assistance of
counsel. Gault established a constitutional right to an attorney
in delinquency proceedings. 16 2 Prior to Gault, lawyers appeared in perhaps five percent of delinquency cases. Shortly after Gault, observers reported that juveniles were neither
adequately advised of their rights nor had counsel appointed for
them.1 63 In most proceedings whee counsel appeared, they did
nothing.' 4
In the decades since Gault, the promise of counsel remains
unrealized. Despite legal changes, the actual delivery of legal
services lags behind the constitutional mandate. A few studies
of individual counties in a handful of states in the early 1980s
reported rates of representation ranging from twenty-two percent to forty-five percent. 6 5 The only research that reports
statewide data and makes interstate comparisons, found that in
three of the six states surveyed, one-half or less of the juveniles
had counsel. 166 Another study reported that in 1986, the majority of youths in Minnesota were unrepresented and that variations in rates of representation ranged from one-hundred
ment's purposes are beneficent .... The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."); F. ALLEN, supra note 10, at 33-47.
161. Cohen, supra note 86, at 5.
162. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967).
163. Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice:
Gault and Its Implementation, 3 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 491, 505-16 (1969) [hereinafter Lefstein, Stapleton].
164. Ferster & Courtless, Pre-dispositionalData, Role of Counsel and Decisions in a Juvenile Court, 7 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 195, 207 (1972).
165. Recent evaluations indicate that lawyers still appear less often than
might be expected. Clarke and Koch found that only 22.3% and 45.8% of
juveniles were represented in two sites in North Carolina. Clarke & Koch,
supra note 126, at 297. Aday found rates of representation of 26.2% and 38.7%
in a southeastern state. Aday, CourtStructure, Defense Attorney Use, and Juvenile CourtDecisions,27 SoC. Q. 107, 112-14 (1986). Only 32% of juveniles in
a large north central city were represented. Walter & Ostrander, An Observational Study of a Juvenile Court, 33 Juv. & FAM.CT. J., Aug. 1982, at 53, 59.
Bortner reported that only 41.8% of juveniles in a large, midwestern county's
juvenile court had an attorney. Bortner, supra note 72, at 139.
166. In Nebraska, the rate of representation was 52.7%; in Minnesota,
47.7%; in North Dakota, only 37.5%. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State
Comparison of the Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ.
393, 400-02 (1988).
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percent in one county to less than five percent in several
others. 167 Nearly one-third of juveniles removed from their
homes and more than one-quarter of those confined in institutions never saw a lawyer.168 Although juveniles charged with
serious offenses are more likely to be represented, 169 they constitute a small part of juvenile court dockets. It is the far larger
group of youths charged with minor offenses who are most
likely to be incarcerated without representation. 170
The most common explanation for why so many juveniles
are unrepresented is that they waive their right to counsel. 171
Courts use the adult standard, "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" under the "totality of the circumstances," to assess the validity of juveniles' waivers of constitutional rights. 172 The
crucial issue for juveniles, as for adults, is whether a waiver of
counsel can be "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" if it is
made without consulting with an attorney. The problem is exacerbated when judges seek waivers of counsel as a predetermined result. They give cursory and misleading advisories that
suggest waiver is a meaningless technicality and then become
responsible for interpreting the juvenile's response.
The "totality" approach to juveniles' waivers of rights has
been criticized as a prescription for injustice and an example of
treating juveniles just like adults when equality puts them at a
167. Feld, supra note 2, at 190 n.162; Feld, supra note 166, at 402; Feld,
supra note 126, at 1214 nn.142-43.
168. Feld, supra note 126, at 1238.
169. Feld, supra note 166, at 401-02; Feld, supra note 126, at 1220-21.
170. Feld, supra note 126, at 1239-40.
171. There are a variety of possible explanations for why so many youths
are unrepresented: parental reluctance to retain an attorney; inadequate public-defender services in nonurban areas; judicial encouragement of waivers of
counsel in order to ease their administrative burdens; cursory and misleading
judicial advisories that suggest that waiver is simply a meaningless technicality; continuing judicial hostility to an advocacy role in juvenile court; or judicial predetermination of dispositions and denial of counsel where probation is
anticipated. Whatever the reasons, most juveniles in most states never see a
lawyer, waive their right to counsel without consulting with or appreciating
the consequences of relinquishing counsel, and confront the power of the State
alone and unaided. Bortner, supra note 72, at 139; W. STAPLETON & L. TErrEiBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH 36 (1972); Feld, supra note 2, at 40; Feld, supra
note 126, at 1323; Lefstein, Stapleton, supra note 163, at 537-38.
172. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); Feld, supra note 2, at 169;
Feld, supra note 126, at 1323-25. The Supreme Court has held that an adult
defendant could waive counsel and appear pro se in state criminal trials so
long as he or she chooses to do so. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834
(1975); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
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disadvantage. 173 Juveniles simply are not as capable as adults
to waive their constitutional rights in a knowing and intelligent
manner. 174 While several states recognize this developmental
fact, 175 most states, including Minnesota, allow juveniles to
waive counsel without consultation and confront the power of
the State alone and unaided.
The questionable validity of juvenile waiver raises collateral legal issues. Absent a valid waiver, the appointment of
counsel is a constitutional prerequisite to any sentence restricting liberty. 7 6 Despite this doctrine, one-third of the Minnesota
juveniles removed from their homes and more than one-quarter of those confined in institutions were unrepresented. It is
also unconstitutional to use prior convictions obtained without
counsel to enhance later sentences. 17 7 Every time juvenile
court judges use prior uncounseled convictions to sentence
juveniles, to impose mandatory minimum or enhanced
sentences, to waive juveniles to criminal court, or to "bootstrap" status offenders into delinquents through the contempt
power, 7 8 they compound the injustice of the original denial of
counsel.
III. TEE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT: REFORMED BUT NOT
REHABILITATED
The recent changes in juvenile court jurisdiction, sentenc173. Feld, supra note 2, at 173-76; see Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to
Waive MirandaRights: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134, 1138-40
(1980) (the totality approach may not comport with Gault if "the great majority of juveniles do not understand or appreciate their rights, yet are deemed to
have waived those rights").
174. T. GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS 128-30 (1981); Grisso, supra
note 173, at 1166.
175. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West 1985) (prohibiting either waivers of
counsel or incarceration of unrepresented delinquents); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.23 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990) (same). See generally INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADmiN., ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL (1980)
(guidelines for lawyers in dealing with juvenile cases).
176. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979).
177. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 222, 224 (1980) (per curiam); United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115
(1967). Courts have applied this principle to juvenile prior convictions as well.
See Rizzo v. United States, 821 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1987); Grant v. White,
579 F.2d 48, 49 (8th Cir. 1978); see also In re J.W., 164 Ill. App. 3d 826, 830, 518
N.E.2d 310, 313 (1987) (uncounseled juvenile convictions may not be used to
adjudicate a juvenile as a habitual offender).
178. In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 38, 191 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1972).
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ing, and procedures reflect ambivalence about the role of juvenile courts and the control of children. As juvenile courts
converge procedurally and substantively with criminal courts,
is there any reason to maintain a separate court whose only distinctions are procedures under which no adult would agree to
be tried?
The juvenile court is at a philosophical crossroads that cannot be resolved by simplistic formulations, such as treatment
versus punishment. In reality, there are no practical or operational differences between the two. Acknowledging that juvenile courts punish, imposes an obligation to provide all criminal
procedural safeguards because, in the words of Gault, "the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." 179
While procedural parity with adults may sound the death-knell
of the juvenile court, to fail to do so perpetuates injustice. To
treat similarly situated juveniles differently, to punish them in
the name of treatment, and to deny them basic safeguards fosters a sense of injustice that thwarts any efforts to
rehabilitate.18 0
Abolishing juvenile courts is desirable both for youths and
society. After more than two decades of constitutional and legislative reform, juvenile courts continue to deflect, co-opt, ignore, or absorb ameliorative tinkering with minimal
institutional change. Despite its transformation from a welfare
agency to a criminal court, the juvenile court remains essentially unreformed. The quality of justice youths receive would
be intolerable if it were adults facing incarceration. Public and
political concerns about drugs and youth crime foster a "get
tough" mentality to repress rather than rehabilitate young offenders. With fiscal constraints, budget deficits, and competition from other interest groups, there is little likelihood that
treatment services for delinquents will expand. Coupling the
emergence of punitive policies with our societal unwillingness
to provide for the welfare of children in general, much less to
those who commit crimes, there is simply no reason to believe
that the juvenile court can be rehabilitated.
Without a juvenile court, an adult criminal court that administers justice for young offenders could provide children
with all the procedural guarantees already available to adult
defendants and additional enhanced protections because of the
179. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
180. Melton, supra note 59, at 168.
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children's vulnerability and immaturity.18 1 The only virtue of
the contemporary juvenile court is that juveniles convicted of
18 2
serious crimes receive shorter sentences than do adults.
Youthfulness, however, long has been recognized as a mitigating, even if not an excusing, condition at sentencing.1as The
common law's infancy defense presumed that children below
age fourteen lacked criminal capacity, emphasized their lack of
fault, and made youthful irresponsibility explicit. Youths older
than fourteen are mature enough to be responsible for their behavior, but immature enough as to not deserve punishment
commensurate with adults.184 If shorter sentences for diminished responsibility is the rationale for punitive juvenile courts,
then providing an explicit "youth discount" to reduce adult
sentences can ensure an intermediate level of just punishment.1 8 5 Reduced adult sentences do not require young people
to be incarcerated with adults; existing juvenile prisons allow
the segregation of offenders by age.
Full procedural parity in criminal courts coupled with
mechanisms to expunge records, restore civil rights, and the
like can more adequately protect young people than does the
current juvenile court. Abolishing juvenile courts, however,
should not gloss over the many deficiencies of criminal courts
such as excessive case loads, insufficient sentencing options, ineffective representation, and over-reliance on plea bargains.
These are characteristics of juvenile courts as well.
Ideological changes in strategies of social control and the
conception of children produced the juvenile court. One of
these ideas, strategies of social control, no longer distinguishes
juvenile from criminal courts. Despite their inability to prevent or reduce youth crime, juvenile courts survive and even
prosper. Despite statutory and judicial reforms, official discretion arguably has increased rather than decreased. Why, even
181. See Feld, supra note 2, at 275-76; Melton, supra note 59, at 152; Rosenberg, ConstitutionalRights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposalfor a
Return to the Not So DistantPast,27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 671 (1980).
182. Zimring, supra note 63, at 197.
183. Thomson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) ("a young person is not
capable of acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate
penalty"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) ("chronological age of
a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight"); Melton, supra
note 59, at 152-53.
184. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some Observations on a Recent
Trend, 10 INT'L J. L. & PsYCHIATRY 129, 148-50 (1987); Melton, supra note 59,
at 152.
185. Feld, Punishment,Treatment, supra note 3, at 912.
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without empirical support, does the ideology of therapeutic justice persist so tenaciously?
The answer is that the social control is directed at children.
Despite humanitarian claims of being a child-centered nation,
our cultural conception of children supports institutional arrangements that deny the personhood of young people. In legal
doctrine, children are not entitled to liberty, but to custody.
We care less about other people's children than we do our own,
especially when those children are of other colors or
86
cultures.'
Children, especially by adolescence, are more competent
than the law acknowledges. 187 We can recognize young people's
competence as a basis for greater autonomy without equating it
with full criminal responsibility. Many social institutions families, schools, the economy, and the law - systematically
disable adolescents, deny them opportunities to be responsible
and autonomous, and then use the resulting immaturity to justify imposing further disabilities. Rejecting the juvenile court's
premise that young people are inherently irresponsible can begin a process of reexamining childhood that extends to every
institution that touches their lives.

186.
187.

J. SuTrON, SuPra note 12, at 257.
Melton, supra note 59, at*153.

